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Arbitration has evolved as a preeminent conflict resolution process in
international commerce, largely because it affords some escape from uncer-
tainty for the foreign trader faced with the diversity of national legal systems.
There have existed for many years nongovernmental institutional systems for
international arbitration, and they have been widely utilized. However, a major
evolution occurred when the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL) developed a Model Law on Commercial Arbitration. This
Model Law offers a universal law of arbitration. It is designed for incorporation
into the municipal law of the nation state and offers the greatest promise to date
that international arbitration will be respected by local courts as an independent
dispute resolution process.
This promise is important. Local arbitration laws and procedures have varied
considerably among different nations and different institutional systems and are
often obscure or unexpected to a foreign party. Furthermore, local courts have
not always been friendly to international arbitration. The UNCITRAL Model
Law, echoing the purposes of UNCITRAL itself, is designed to promote unifor-
mity of international trade law on a global basis, affording a special avenue of
predictability by establishing enforceable uniform practices and procedures.
On December 11, 1985, the United Nations General Assembly urged members
to give serious thought to adopting the Model Law.' In the United States, how-
ever, quite apart from questions of specific amendment of the Model Law, the
question of adoption of the Model Law meets the somewhat unique, but inevi-
table, issues posed by our federal system. Fundamental to the question of adop-
tion of the Model Law in the United States is whether the adoption should be
through state or federal law or through some parallel of state and federal law.
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As the Model Law begins to find its way into U.S. law, the state law model is
the one that has been adopted. The Legislature of California put itself at the
forefront of the legal market for international arbitration when it enacted, in
March 1988, a law modeled on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration. 2 Florida had already used the UNCITRAL Model Law
as a partial source for the Florida International Arbitration Act.3 A Connecticut
law became effective on October 1, 1989, 4 Texas adopted its version on Sep-
tember 1, 1989, 5 and other states are considering adoption of the Model Law.
California, however, was the first state to undertake a wholesale adoption. This
new law (CIACC or the California International Arbitration and Conciliation
Code), supersedes most provisions of California's general arbitration law6 with
respect to international commercial arbitrations. The new law does not supersede
preexisting provisions of California law relating to enforcement of awards.
7
The state law approach, now established in California and other states, has been
encouraged and endorsed in a study by a committee of the Washington Foreign
Law Society.8 The Foreign Law Society specifically considered the question of
whether the Model Law should be enacted on a state or federal level. The study
recommended that, while some amendments to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)
incorporating a handful of provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law would be
desirable, Congress should not consider general adoption of the UNCITRAL
Model Law. 9 Foreign Law Society committee further recommended that the
Model Law should be adopted through state law. 10 Other comment has not been
significantly different. In a report to the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, the New York Association's Committee on Arbitration and Alternative
Dispute Resolution recommended only minor amendment of federal law in re-
lation to the Model Law."1 While not directly addressing the question of state
versus federal adoption, the committee indicated no particular concern about
adoption of the Model Law through state law, except to question the usefulness
of state adoption as a means of attracting international arbitrations. 
12
2. The Act adds title 9.3 to part 3 of the CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE commencing with § 1297. 11.
3. 39 FLA. STAT. § 684.01 (1986).
4. 1989 Conn. Acts 89-179 (Reg. Sess.).
5. The Act amends title 10 by adding part 3 to TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 249-1 to -43.
6. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1284.2 (West 1982).
7. Id. 88 1285-1289.
8. Hunnicutt, Boyd, Stevenson, Juster, Hershey, Broches, Deming, Hudes, Menefee, Shely &
Labat, Report to the Washington Foreign Law Society on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, 3 OHIo ST. J. DisPuTE RESOLUTION 303-60 (1988) [hereinafter Hunnicutt].
9. Id. at 311-17.
10. Id. at 326.
11. Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration as Federal
or State Legislation, Report of the Committee on Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, ARB. & L. 250 (1988-89) [hereinafter Alternative
Dispute Resolution Report] (nothing in the report suggests that New York should adopt the Model
Law).
12. Id. at 260.
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All in all, the fundamental question of whether state law adoption is the right
or wrong direction has received negligible consideration in these reports or
elsewhere. California's adoption indicates a national choice to frame the regime
of international arbitration through state law rather than federal law. This appears
to be the choice notwithstanding existence within the FAA (originally enacted in
1925) of a substantial body of federal arbitration law that touches on international
arbitration. Also included at the federal level is the multilateral treaty known as
the New York Convention. '
3
The provisions of this Convention are implemented as chapter 2 of the FAA, 14
which ensures the recognition and enforcement of most international commercial
arbitral agreements and awards by the courts of any signatory State.
The thesis of this article is that the law regulating international arbitration in
the United States should be federal law. To the extent state enactment of the
Model Law is pursued, it creates a federal-state duality in the law of international
arbitration that significantly undermines the purposes of uniformity and predict-
ability that the Model Law is designed to achieve. It gives rise to a variety of
complex, litigation-generating problems.
I. The Rationale (or Lack Thereof) for the State Law Approach
The committee of the Washington Foreign Law Society, while purporting to
examine the merits of a state or federal approach, offers little in the way of
explanation for its conclusion that state enactment is the appropriate route. Its
report simply concludes, in summary fashion, that existing federal law is ade-
quate to support international arbitration and that "there is no perceived need for
adoption of the entire Model Law at the federal level." Consequently, the com-
mittee reasons, Congress cannot be expected to enact the Model Law. '
5
Even in conjunction with state enactment, the question of state versus federal
adoption has not been well examined or subjected to much question. The reason
is evident. The incentive for state enactment has little, if anything, to do with the
merits of a state law approach as distinguished from a federal approach. Appar-
13. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958,
21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997.
14. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988), first enacted Feb. 12, 1925 (43 Stat. 883), codified July 30, 1947
(61 Stat. 669), and amended Sept. 3, 1954 (68 Stat. 1233); chapter 2 was added July 31, 1970 (84
Stat. 692).
15. The Committee elaborated as follows:
The Committee does not recommend that Congress adopt the UNCITRAL Model
Law in its entirety, at least at this time. Existing federal arbitration law is strongly
supportive in its enforcement of international arbitration agreements and recognition
and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Furthermore, the provisions of the FAA
and federal case law are adequate to support arbitration in general and international
commercial arbitration law in particular. Thus, there is no perceived need for adoption
of the entire Model Law at the federal level, and without a clearly perceived need, it
would be politically unrealistic to expect that Congress could be persuaded to enact the
Model Law.
Hunnicutt, supra note 8, at 311.
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ently the bar and legislature of California as well as other states perceive a strong
economic incentive to offer a local forum to international business disputants.
This explains both the lack of examination of the merits of a state versus federal
approach and the reason why the state law approach has so far prevailed.
II. The Domestic Federal-State Arbitration
Law Regime and International Arbitration
The question for the future of international arbitration in the United States is
not simply federal versus state enactment. If the choice is state law, the question
becomes one of the relationship of the state enactment to a substantial body of
federal arbitration law and the federal interest implicit in international dispute
resolution. This question is naturally posed because international arbitration
usually involves diversity of parties and federal interests and typically finds its
way to federal rather than state court.
The relationship of federal and state law in arbitration has never been easy. Federal
arbitration statutes and treaties may preempt state law, but federal law does not
occupy the field.' 6 Repeatedly, issues of conflict between state law and federal law
are raised. Thus, the Supreme Court has ruled that a California statute prohibiting
arbitration in certain categories of disputes must yield to the FAA, which specifically
provides for enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards.17 But a state law
providing for the taking of depositions or other forms of discovery in arbitration
proceedings would probably not be in conflict with federal arbitration law and,
unless in conflict with a treaty restricting discovery,' 8 would not be preempted.
Courts have held that the FAA does not preempt all state law, but only those laws that
override the parties' choice to arbitrate rather than litigate and that therefore are in
direct conflict with the federal statute's primary purpose of ensuring the enforcement
of privately negotiated arbitration agreements.' 
9
There may be a point at which a state law that is purely procedural and does
not conflict with any specific provision of federal law nevertheless would be so
burdensome as to effectively frustrate the agreement to arbitrate. However, in a
recent controversial decision, Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trust-
ees of the Leland Stanford Junior University,20 the Supreme Court significantly
narrowed the scope of this position by upholding a stay of arbitration by a
16. "The FAA contains no express preemptive provision, nor does it reflect a congressional
intent to occupy the entire field of arbitration." Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees
of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 109 S. Ct. 1248, 1254 (1989).
17. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-15 (1984).
18. See, e.g., Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, opened for signature Mar. 18,
1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231, containing restrictive provisions for
discovery.
19. Keystone Shipping Co. v. New England Energy, Inc., 855 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988); Socidt6
G nrrale de Surveillance v. Raytheon European Management & Sys. Co., 643 F.2d 863 (1st Cir.
1981).
20. 109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989).
VOL. 25, NO. I
INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION LAW 213
California court under California Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2(c)
pending resolution of related litigation between one party to the arbitration and
third parties not bound by the arbitration agreement. After the majority opinion
in Volt, to which there were only two dissents, it must be assumed that most
procedural aspects of arbitrations not addressed in federal statutes or treaties can
be regulated by state or other local (domestic or foreign) law deemed by the
finder of fact to be applicable by reason of choice by the parties, or absent such
choice, choice of law principles. This assumption is valid only to the extent that
a regulation is not so extreme as to effectively deprive (not just delay) the right
of a party to avail itself of its contractual right to arbitration. 2 1 The Foreign Law
Society Report notes, for instance, that section 3 of the FAA, which provides for
stay of proceedings to compel arbitration, and section 4, which provides for
orders compelling arbitration, would probably preempt inconsistent state court
procedures. 22 The rationale is that these provisions are integral to the federal
policy favoring arbitration.
But Volt does not dispose of the preemption issues raised so naturally by
international arbitration. International arbitration, like international adjudication,
typically involves parties of diverse nationality and international commerce and
is therefore rife with federal interest. 23 Moreover, insofar as international arbi-
tration is related to domestic litigation, it most likely occurs in conjunction with
federal rather than state court proceedings. Volt was a domestic arbitration in
state court, raising the issue of preemption of state law by the FAA. Its essen-
tially choice of law rationale may not apply to give deference to state law where
the parties to an arbitration in a U.S. state did not expressly select that state
forum, but are there under a broad jurisdictional provision such as article 1 of
CIACC, which is even broader than proposed in the Model Law.24
It can be argued, with some foundation, that where federal law does speak,
federal law is preemptive on all procedural inconsistencies affecting international
arbitration. Though the United States Supreme Court has said that the FAA does
not create any independent federal jurisdiction,25 the holding involved chapter 1
of the FAA and not chapter 2, which implements the New York Convention on
enforcement of arbitral awards. 26 Section 203 expressly provides that in arbitra-
tions governed by the Convention federal district courts do have original juris-
diction regardless of the amount in controversy, and section 205 provides for the
21. Id. at 1255.
22. Hunnicutt, supra note 8, at 325.
23. Such as equal treatment for foreign nationals; see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 711(b), (c) (1987); id. § 722 (rights of aliens).
Numerous treaties guarantee civil, economic, and other rights to aliens. See Avigliano v. Sumitomo
Shoji Am., Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
24. See infra text section III.A.
25. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984); Perry v. Thomas, 462 U.S. 483, 489
(1987); Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25 n.32 (1983).
26. 9 U.S.C. §§ 202-205 (1988).
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removal of such actions to a federal court. 2 7 These provisions indicate congres-
sional recognition of the strong federal interest in international arbitration, as
opposed to domestic arbitrations, and could imply preemption of state arbitration
law pertaining to international arbitrations.
A question arises, for example, as to state arbitration laws with provisions
relating to recognition and enforcement of awards that differ from those set forth
in the FAA or the New York Convention. 2 8 It can be argued that federal juris-
diction established by the FAA for enforcement of agreements and awards under
the Convention evidences an intent by Congress that only federal law should
apply to such enforcement actions. If so, actions for enforcement, correction, or
vacation of such awards, whether brought in state or federal courts, should be
governed exclusively by provisions of the federal law. If this was not the intent
of the Congress, then only the "outcome determinative" provisions of the fed-
eral law, such as time limitations,29 should be applied by both state and federal
courts, and state courts should apply those provisions of state law that are not
"outcome determinative" to the process of confirming or objecting to an award.
The difficulty is in determining what is or is not "outcome determinative." Dif-
ferences in language contained in state law, the FAA, and the Convention per-
taining to the grounds for refusing recognition and enforcement, as interpreted by
diverse courts, could mean significant differences in result. 30 Accordingly, this
creates significant uncertainty. Similar questions of preemption appear, for in-
stance, in connection with "interim measures of protection," which are expressly
provided for by article 11 of the Model Law, but not in the FAA. Uncertainty
already exists among the federal courts as to whether the FAA allows or precludes
interim measures.
3 1
27. There are currently eighty-one countries that are parties to the New York Convention. See M.
BOWMAN & D. HARRIS MULTILATERAL TREATIES (Sixth Supp. 1989). It follows that a very high
percentage of international commercial arbitrations will fall under its provisions.
28. California did not adopt chs. VII or VIII of the Model Law, nor any other new law governing
the confirmation or review by any court of awards in international commercial cases. Applications to
California courts to confirm, correct, or vacate such awards would, to the extent not preempted by
federal law, be governed by title 9, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE, chs. 4 & 5, the same law that governs
in domestic cases.
29. Under ch. I of the FAA, there is a one-year period of limitation on petitioning the court for
confirmation of an award and a three-month period of limitation on requesting correction or vacation.
9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 12 (1988). Under ch. 2, the period of limitations for both confirmation and vacation
is three years. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1988). Under title 9, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE ch. 4, § 1288, a
petition to confirm must be filed no later than four years after the award, and a petition to correct or
vacate must be filed not later than 100 days after the award. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1288 (West
1982).
30. For a comparison of the grounds for setting aside an award under the Model Law with those
of the FAA and The Uniform Arbitration Act, see the Report to the Washington Foreign Law Society,
2 INT'L ARB. REP. (Meally) 772, apps. E & F (1987).
31. See McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir. 1974); Carolina
Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Cooper v. Ateliers de la
Motobecane, S.A., 57 N.Y.2d 408, 442 N.E.2d 1239 (1982).
VOL. 25, NO. I
INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION LAW 215
Whatever the scope of federal preemption in international arbitration, a shared
purview of state and federal arbitration law generates such uncertainties, though
the parties, in choosing arbitration, have sought predictability. To the extent state
jurisdiction is found and state law prevails, and to the extent there are ambiguities
and inconsistencies from state to state and between federal and state laws con-
cerning international arbitration, arbitration in the United States is rendered less
viable as a dispute resolution mechanism for international parties.
III. The Disharmony of Current Federal Law
and State Enactment of the Model Law
State enactment of a Model Law of international arbitration superimposed on
the shifting sands of federal-state demarcation of international arbitration law and
procedure only adds to arbitral uncertainty. This can be demonstrated in several
areas.
A. STATE LAW ENLARGEMENT OF THE MODEL LAW
Problems not contemplated by the draftsmen of the Model Law or the com-
mentators occur when the state enactment is more ambitious than, or otherwise
modifies, the Model Law. For instance, this occurs in the most basic respect
under the California law. The CIACC asserts a broader coverage than the Model
Law. The scope of application of the CIACC is covered in article I, commencing
with section 1297.11. It initially provides that the CLACC applies to "interna-
tional commercial arbitration and conciliation" and is subject to any treaty to
which the United States is a party. It specifies that most provisions of the new law
apply only if the place of arbitration is in California. The article then defines
"international" and "commercial" more broadly than these terms are defined in
the Model Law. 32 The result is that the CIACC purports to apply to virtually
every arbitration in California that is commercial in nature and that has any
international character, in terms of places of business, place of performance, or
subject matter. Thus, although arbitration must be based on consent of all parties,
the CIACC might apply without the parties having knowingly specified the
application of California law. If the arbitration clause or system adopted by the
parties leaves the place of arbitration to the arbitrators or to another third person,
the parties might not even have agreed to California as the place of arbitration.
32. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1297.13(b), (d) (West Supp. 1990) deems "international" to be
any place that is in a state other than the parties' place of business, where a substantial part of the
obligations of the commercial relationship is to be performed; the place with which the subject matter
is most closely related; or when the subject matter of the arbitration agreement is otherwise related
to commercial interests in more than one state. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.16 (West Supp. 1990)
includes the following as commercial, if arising out of a relationship of a commercial nature:
construction; insurance; licensing; factoring; consulting; the transfer of data or technology; trade-
marks, patents, and copyrights. The Code, however, does not limit jurisdiction to these items.
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This broad application may not "shock the conscience," but might, under the
choice of law rationale of the Volt case, limit the extent to which a federal court
sitting in California in a diversity case would permit application of California law
or permit California to impose its statutory procedures on an arbitration governed
by the FAA. It certainly creates uncertainty as to applicable law.
CIACC defines "court," "superior court," and "supreme court" as referring
to the California court system, 33 and all provisions that apply to intervention by
a court 34 specifically permit California superior court intervention. However,
most cases that are governed by the CIACC will be subject to federal court
jurisdiction by reason of diversity of citizenship or because an issue of federal
law is involved or because the case falls under the New York Convention. 35 In
some cases a federal court may already have assumed jurisdiction and ordered
the arbitration. Quite apart from any question of preemption, the further question
naturally arises as to whether or to what extent a federal district court will apply
the CIACC.
A federal court will have little guidance in determining whether it should apply
CIACC provisions absent any facts indicating a choice of California law by the
parties. This absence of positive choice of California law would seem to weigh
the determination in favor of federal law. However, the court may decide that the
parties, by choosing California as the place of arbitration (a matter that may itself
be highly uncertain given the broad claim of article I), signified an intention that
California's law of arbitration should apply.
36
Finally, even if the parties to the arbitration have agreed to California law, Volt
leaves open the question as to what extent the chosen law will impair the arbitral
process. For example, even before Volt federal circuit court opinions differed in
considering the issue whether the FAA bars a federal court from consolidating
arbitrations under state law when no provision of the arbitration agreement or of
federal law provides for such consolidation.3 7
B. PROBLEMS OF FEDERAL/STATE INTERACTION
Not only do the grounds and process for challenge of arbitrators vary signif-
icantly between California's version of the Model Law and federal law; these
33. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 1297.21(f), (h), (i) (West Supp. 1990).
34. Id. § 1297.61.
35. 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1988).
36. Domke, Com. Arb. (Callaghan) § 25:02 (rev. ed. 1984) [hereinafter Domke].
37. In New England Energy Co. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d I (Ist Cir. 1988) the First
Circuit ruled that the FAA does not bar a federal court from consolidating two arbitrations under state
law when no provision of the arbitration agreement or federal law provides for such consolidation.
The Courts of Appeals of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits had held that federal district courts had no
power to order consolidation in similar circumstances. See Del E. Webb Constr. v. Richardson Hosp.
Auth., 823 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1987); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Western Seas Shipping Co., 743 F.2d 635
(9th Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari in Keystone, 109 S. Ct. 1527
(1989), in the same term of its decision in Volt, 109 S. Ct. 1248 (1989). In Keystone, as in Volt, the
parties had agreed to the application of state law, or so the Court found.
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provisions of California's enactment of the Model Law also differ significantly
from other arbitral regimes, such as the UNCITRAL rules and the rules
administered by the American Arbitration Association. For example, under
section 1297.121 of the CIACC a prospective arbitrator must disclose whether
he or she has served as arbitrator or conciliator in another proceeding involving
one or more parties to the proceeding. The disclosure requirements cannot be
waived as to the neutral arbitrator even by the agreement of all interested
parties.38 If an arbitrator is challenged, the arbitration tribunal decides on the
challenge. If the tribunal does not sustain the challenge, the matter goes for
decision, on request of the challenging party (which request must be made
within thirty days after notice of the panel's decision), to the appropriate
California superior court. 39 The decision of the superior court is final and is not
subject to appeal. 4 °
This procedure raises at least two questions of federal-state interaction, since
the FAA does not contain provisions similar to those contained in chapter 3 of the
CIACC. Although federal precedents have made it clear that failure to disclose
even the slightest pecuniary interest of an arbitrator is sufficient to void an
award, 4' it is not at all certain that the federal standard includes all of the grounds
for challenge that are found in CIACC section 1297.121.42 Secondly, federal
courts have held that under the FAA the courts' power to deal with arbitrator bias
is limited to setting aside the award after it has been rendered.4 3 Will federal
courts apply any or all provisions of the CIACC relating to challenge of arbi-
trators? If the arbitration tribunal decides against the challenge and the challenger
requests a decision by a California court, can the other party insist on removal
to a federal court? If the challenger does not request decision by a court after an
adverse decision by the tribunal, can the challenger nonetheless raise the issue in
federal court after the award has been rendered? None of these issues would arise
if the Model Law had been enacted at a federal level instead of by way of state
law.
C. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS OF FEDERAL LAW
It is myopic to conclude, as the Foreign Law Committee concluded in rejecting
federal enactment of the Model Law, that federal law is presently adequate to
support international arbitration. The committee study virtually admits the con-
38. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.122 (West Supp. 1990).
39. Id. § 1297.134.
40. Id. § 1297.135.
41. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 148 (1968).
42. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1297.121 (c) (West Supp. 1990) requires disclosure of information
when the person submitted for appointment or designation as arbitrator or conciliator served as an
arbitrator or conciliator in another proceeding involving one or more of the parties to the proceeding.
43. See Conley v. San Carlo Opera Co., 163 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1947); Catz Am. Co. v. Pearl
Grange Fruit Exchange, 292 F. Supp. 549, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); In re Dover Steamship Co., 143
F. Supp. 738, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); see also Domke, supra note 36, § 22:03.
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trary by suggesting significant amendments to harmonize federal law with the
Model Law. The suggestion of these amendments also belies the second justifi-
cation given by the committee for not endorsing a federal law approach: that
Congress perceives no need for such action. If this is correct, why should
Congress look with any greater favor on the significant amendments of federal
arbitration law that the committee concluded are needed to reconcile state en-
actment with current federal law? Indeed, one would think that, politically,
promotion of a change in federal law would come more easily in the form of the
Model Law, as a single important step in the evolution of international dispute
resolution, than in the complicated and less attractive adjustment of disjunctive
parts of the Model Law to existing and disparate federal law.
The amendments to federal law proposed by the Washington Foreign Law
Society include adoption at the federal level of article 9 of the Model Law
providing for "interim measures ordered by a court," article 12, concerning
"challenge of arbitrators," article 20, concerning "tribunal authority to name
the place of arbitration if the parties have not done so," and article 28, providing
guidelines for the arbitral tribunal to use in deciding what rules are to apply to the
substance of a dispute. 44 The Society also noted a number of other areas of
disharmony with current federal law, including article 16, which provide for
"appeal to court of tribunal's ruling that it has jurisdiction," article 17, which
provides for the power of a tribunal to order interim measures, and article 26(1),
which authorizes "independent experts appointed by tribunal. ' 4 5 Similarly, the
Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, while rejecting
any major modification of federal law, recommended, at the very least, federal
adoption of legislation reflecting the principles in article 9 of the Model Law,
which provide for interim measures of protection in aid of arbitration. The
Committee also recommended that U.S. courts designate the venue for an in-
ternational commercial arbitration when the parties have not established a venue
in their agreement.46
It is accordingly clear that without the amendments of federal law, adoption of
the Model Law by the states will result in significant disharmony between state
and federal law. This disharmony has already been struck between California law
and federal law. The problem is demonstrated, for instance, by the matter of
"Competence of Tribunal to Rule on Its Jurisdiction," which is contained in
chapter 4, article 1, of the Model Law and which was enacted as section
1297.161 of the CIACC. The concept that the tribunal may rule on its own
jurisdiction appears at first blush to be consistent with federal policy. However,
44. Hunnicutt, supra note 8, 312-17.
45. Id. at 316.
46. Alternative Dispute Resolution Report, supra note 11, at 259. The proposed amendment of
federal law for court-determined venue is intended to reflect art. 20(2) of the Model Law, though art.
20(2) leaves the determination of venue for the arbitral tribunal to decide, where the parties have not
agreed on the place of arbitration.
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the decision of the arbitral tribunal on its jurisdiction must not conflict with any
court order. Herein lies the problem. Section 1297.166 provides that a party may
ask the appropriate California superior court to decide the matter if the tribunal
has ruled that it does have jurisdiction, though a party is deemed to have waived
any objection unless it has made the request to the court within thirty days after
receiving notice of the ruling. Certainly, these provisions can have no effect on
the power of a federal court under the FAA to issue an order compelling arbi-
tration. But the FAA does not include any similar provision for interlocutory
reexamination by a court of the tribunal's ruling affirming its jurisdiction, while
it does provide for vacating an award where the arbitrators have exceeded their
powers.47 Will a federal court enforce the waiver provision of section 1297.166?
Case law suggests that lack of timely objection, under certain circumstances,
does constitute a waiver of this issue, and the thirty-day requirement may,
therefore, be enforced as not inconsistent with federal policy.48 The difficult
question is whether a federal court will be willing to examine the tribunal's
ruling on jurisdiction prior to the rendition of the award, and if the federal court
is not, will it be bound by the California decision on the subject? Thus state court
enactment of the Model Law here creates a serious disjunction and confusion
between federal and state procedure. It forces the federal court either to claim an
exclusive jurisdiction that would be difficult to justify or to adopt the procedure
of state law, or to allow by default important decisions to be effectively pre-
empted by state courts.
The disharmony is not only the disharmony of confusion. There are clear
inconsistencies between federal arbitration law and the Model Law as adopted in
California. A major inconsistency, for example, is the matter of reasoned awards.
Section 1297.313 of the California statute requires that an arbitral award shall
state "the reasons on which it is based unless the parties have agreed that no
reasons are to be given." The FAA has no such requirement. While the laws of
many other countries require arbitrators to state the reasons for their awards, this
has not been the practice in the United States, at least not in commercial arbi-
trations. The rules of the major U.S. arbitral organizations such as the American
Arbitration Association do not provide for opinions by arbitrators in domestic
commercial cases.4 9
The provision concerning reasoned awards is especially problematical because
of its ambiguity. It fails to provide any guidelines as to how detailed and com-
47. 9 U.S.C. § 10(d) (1982).
48. Comprehensive Accounting Corp. v. Rudell, 760 F.2d 138, 141 (7th Cir. 1985).
49. Domke, supra note 36, § 29:06; see also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S.
198, 203 (1956). The conventional theory in the United States is that the provision of reasons defeats
the finality of arbitration, in that an arbitration award is more vulnerable to attack in the courts if
reasons for it are given. Another rationale may be that the giving of reasons can inhibit the arbitral
process where arbitrators in a complex case, though perhaps expert, are not trained in the law and are
not professionally adept at protective articulation of their awards.
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plete the stated reasons must be, and does not state the consequences of an
inadequate statement. It is possible, but not at all certain, under section
1297.331(b), that a party may request the correction of any inadequacy within
thirty days after receipt of the award. However, failure to do so may constitute
a waiver under section 1297.41. Though the Model Law and state enactments,
such as the CIACC, require a reasoned award, it seems highly unlikely that the
absence of adequately stated reasons would constitute grounds for vacating the
award under section 10 of the FAA, though this, too, is uncertain. Even the New
York Convention, to which the United States is a party, does not require reasoned
awards unless such are required by party agreement. If a state court were to deny
enforcement of an unreasoned award, as is apparently required by the CIACC
and the Model Law, this would probably violate the federal policy favoring the
enforcement of awards. The conflict, at least, is certain.
D. STATE AMBITIONS GOING BEYOND THE MODEL LAW
Finally, it is also apparent from a review of state adoption, such as the CIACC,
that the promotional impetus that inspires state enactment of the Model Law may
be dangerously unrestrained and may result in modifications of the Model Law
that further undermine the uniformity and predictability that it was designed to
bring to international arbitration. A gratuitous and egregious addition in the
California enactment demonstrates this tendency. California added a provision
permitting the arbitration tribunal to include attorney's fees in its award, unless
otherwise agreed by the parties. 50 This heretofore unobtrusive provision of the
CIACC is likely to come as an unpleasant shock to the party that was not
especially well advised in agreeing to arbitration in California or that entered into
the agreement before the CIACC was enacted. Indeed, the shock will be severely
compounded, given the broad scope of article I of the CIACC as discussed
above, for the party already surprised to find itself arbitrating in California when
California was not even specified in the contract as the place of arbitration.
A similar provision for awarding attorney's fees can be found in the
UNCITRAL arbitration rules. However, the UNCITRAL rules apply only by
express agreement of the parties. If parties to a dispute have simply agreed to
California as the place of arbitration, they likely have done so for reasons of
convenience that are unrelated to the contacts with the state, if any, or their
relationship with the state, or the substantive law governing such relationship.
Moreover, the place of arbitration may be, and often is, determined by the
arbitrators for their own convenience. If two foreign parties simply choose to
arbitrate in the United States, without specifying the state, they are even more
unlikely to contemplate that legal fees will be awarded. A federal law would
obviate this uncertainty and this surprise, which directly undercuts the purposes
50. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1297.318 (West Supp. 1990).
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the Model Law was created to achieve and which creates serious disincentive to
the use of international arbitration.
IV. Conclusion
The evolution of international arbitration law in the United States is at one of
those junctions in legal history where the road not taken may be forever for-
sworn. State enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law has proceeded to the point
where it is apparent, upon close examination, that disjunctions between state and
federal law and between different state enactments threaten to undermine the
uniformity and predictability essential to international arbitration and the prin-
cipal objectives of the Model Law. As state adoption proceeds, and economic
interests and related bureaucracies coalesce around the state law model, the
possibility and advantage of a uniform federal arbitration law will recede further
into the distance, to the point of disappearance.
Sufficient reason already exists to make the turn to a federal adoption, with
appropriate amendment, of the Model Law. The apparently conventional con-
clusion, appearing in the principal published study,5' that Congress has not
perceived the need for adoption of the Model Law at the federal level, is a poor
excuse for the failure of the bar and legal scholarship to provide some direction
for the legislators. With the states proceeding apace to adopt significantly vary-
ing commercial arbitration statutes to bring the business of international arbitra-
tion to their respective jurisdictions, the irony is that foreign parties are likely to
be discouraged from using a balkanized U.S. forum. The federal interest in a
uniform and predictable legal environment for the foreign trader, still compel-
ling, is certainly threatened. It is time to turn away from the unpromising state-
by-state adoption of international arbitration law to a unified, consistent, and
predictable federal law.
51. Hunnicutt, supra note 8,311-17, 330.
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